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WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A CONCLUSION 
AND A FACT? 
Howard M. Erichson† 
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, building on Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the 
Supreme Court instructed district courts to treat a complaint’s conclusions 
differently from allegations of fact. Facts, but not conclusions, are assumed 
true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. The Court did little to help judges 
or lawyers understand this elusive distinction, and, indeed, obscured the 
distinction with its language. The Court said it was distinguishing “legal 
conclusions” from factual allegations. The application in Twombly and 
Iqbal, however, shows that the relevant distinction is not between law and 
fact, but rather between different types of factual assertions. This Essay, 
written for a symposium on the tenth anniversary of Iqbal, explores the 
definitional problem with the conclusion-fact distinction and examines 
how district courts have applied the distinction in recent cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ten years after Ashcroft v. Iqbal,1 its most basic lesson—that courts 
must treat a complaint’s conclusions differently from its allegations of 
fact—still perplexes me, but I am gradually coming to terms with the 
distinction. While Iqbal’s approach remains troubling as a matter of 
procedural policy, some of the cases applying Iqbal’s conclusion-fact 
distinction fall into buckets where application of the distinction is 
relatively straightforward. The more I see how district judges apply the 
distinction, the less incoherent it seems, even as I continue to worry that 
it denies court access to some plaintiffs with meritorious claims. In this 
Essay, I shall attempt to explain the definitional trouble with the 
distinction but also the way district judges pump meaning into it in 
several categories of cases. 
I. THE INSTRUCTION TO DISTINGUISH CONCLUSIONS FROM FACTS
When the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,2 
the reaction among many lawyers and civil procedure scholars was 
bewilderment.3 The Court held an antitrust complaint insufficient despite 
the complaint’s allegation that a group of telecommunications companies 
agreed not to compete in each other’s geographic markets. Whether one 
agreed or disagreed with the outcome as a matter of policy, the decision 
seemed clearly wrong as an interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8 in light of the rule’s language, history, and prior judicial 
1 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
2 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 3 See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1305 nn.67–69 
(2010) (noting that Twombly “sent shockwaves throughout the legal community—for academics, 
practitioners, and judges alike,” and citing sources). 
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treatment. Rule 8’s language said that a complaint must provide a “short 
and plain” statement of the claim.4 The rule’s history suggested that the 
function of the complaint was to notify the defendant of the claim against 
it rather than to establish the truth of the plaintiffs’ allegations.5 Rule 8’s 
context emphasized the permissiveness of the standard in contrast to the 
heightened pleading standard established by its neighboring rule.6 Courts 
routinely declared that, for purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim, the complaint’s allegations are assumed to be true.7 From 
every direction, it was difficult to square Twombly with the prior 
understanding of Rule 8. When the decision was announced, however, it 
seemed arguably limited to a particular type of case. Justice Souter’s 
majority opinion in Twombly stated, “[w]e granted certiorari to address 
the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through 
allegations of parallel conduct, and now reverse.”8 The Court’s reasoning, 
moreover, focused on the particular problem of expensive discovery in a 
complex antitrust class action.9 Thus, notwithstanding the usual principle 
that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply transsubstantively,10 some 
thought that Twombly’s impact would be limited.11 
 4 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (2014) (abrogated 
2015) (stating that the forms “suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity 
that these rules contemplate”); FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11 (2014) (abrogated 2015) (illustrating the 
barebones approach to pleading considered sufficient under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure). 
 5 See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS & RETRENCHMENT: THE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 137–38 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017). 
 6 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that fraud and mistake be pleaded “with 
particularity.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). The Supreme Court and others regularly invoked the maxim 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius in connection with Rule 9(b) to explain that other types of 
pleadings need not be pleaded with particularity. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics 
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 
 7 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Leatherman, 507 U.S. 163; 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
8 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007) (internal citation omitted). 
9 See id. at 558. 
 10 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings 
in the United States district courts . . . .”). 
 11 See, e.g., Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 
F.R.D. 604, 635 (2007); see also Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 473, 477–79 (2010) (citing arguments that Twombly was limited to antitrust cases or 
to complex cases with a likelihood of expensive discovery); Steinman, supra note 3, at 1305–06. 
902 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:899
Two years later, in Iqbal,12 the Supreme Court removed any doubt 
about the impact of Twombly. If Twombly was wrong, Iqbal multiplied 
the wrong by explicitly making the Twombly interpretation of Rule 8 
transsubstantive.13 The sufficiency of every civil complaint in federal 
court was to be judged according to the Twombly analysis.  
For those who found Twombly mystifying, Iqbal had an apparent 
silver lining: Iqbal explained what judges were supposed to do with 
Twombly. Not only did Iqbal make Twombly transsubstantive, it spelled 
out the steps of the analysis. Whereas Twombly offered little guidance—
the opinion said that complaints must be “plausible,” but it did not 
explain what that word meant or how judges should deploy it—the Iqbal 
majority turned Twombly into a set of judicial instructions for deciding 
motions to dismiss.14 
When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, Iqbal instructed, a 
judge must separate conclusions from facts. On a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint’s allegations of facts are assumed to be true while its allegations 
of conclusions are not entitled to the same assumption. This, according 
to Iqbal, is the first lesson of Twombly. As Justice Kennedy explained in 
the majority opinion, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the 
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. 
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”15 The opinion makes the 
point multiple times: “Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss 
we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we ‘are 
not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 
allegation.’”16 Going into instruction manual mode, the Iqbal opinion 
12 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 13 Id. at 684 (“Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in 
antitrust, the decision was based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8. That Rule in 
turn governs the pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States 
district courts.’ Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading 
standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.”). 
14 See Donald J. Kochan, While Effusive, “Conclusory” Is Still Quite Elusive: The Story of a 
Word, Iqbal, and a Perplexing Lexical Inquiry of Supreme Importance, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 215, 
240 (2011) (“Twombly hinted at the importance of the meaning of ‘conclusory’ to judicial review 
of the sufficiency of pleading, but it was Iqbal that brought it front and center.”). 
15 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
 16 Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); see also id. at 678–79 
(“Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than 
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says that a “court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by 
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, 
are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can 
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 
allegations.”17 
II. IT’S NOT ABOUT LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
The instructions seem clear enough at first glance: separate the 
complaint’s legal conclusions from its factual allegations; assume the 
factual allegations are true; and ask whether those factual allegations state 
a valid legal claim. When one thinks about these instructions in light of 
their application in Twombly and Iqbal, however, the apparent clarity 
fades. The problem is that the terms legal conclusions and factual 
allegations do not match what the Supreme Court did in Twombly and 
Iqbal.  
Suppose a complaint’s only substantive allegation states that 
“Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for violating the Sherman Act.” Every 
judge would agree that this is a legal conclusion; if the complaint says 
nothing more, it should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Now, 
suppose instead that the complaint alleges the existence of an agreement 
among the telecommunications companies BellSouth, Qwest, SBC, and 
Verizon to refrain from competing in each other’s geographic markets for 
Internet and local telephone service.18 The latter is not a legal conclusion; 
it is a factual allegation. It may turn out to be true or untrue, provable or 
unprovable, but what it asserts is not a matter of law but rather a matter 
of fact concerning the existence of an agreement in the real world among 
a group of telecommunications companies. 
Similarly, suppose a complaint’s only substantive allegation states, 
“Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for violating Plaintiff’s rights under the 
Equal Protection Clause.” Again, any judge would label this a legal 
conclusion, and if the complaint says nothing more, it should be 
dismissed. But suppose instead that the complaint alleges the state of 
conclusions.”); id. at 678 (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). 
17 Id. at 679. 
 18 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551 (quoting Amended Complaint ¶ 51, Twombly, 550 U.S 544 
(No. 02 CIV. 10220 (GEL)). 
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mind of two individuals—John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller—that each 
of them acted with the purpose of discriminating on the basis of race, 
religion, or national origin.19 The latter is not a legal conclusion; it is a 
factual allegation. It concerns a fact with legal consequences, to be sure, 
but this does not make it a legal assertion rather than a factual one. The 
allegation that Ashcroft and Mueller designed and implemented a policy 
with discriminatory intent is an assertion of fact just as much as the 
statement, “I drove to the store because I wanted to buy a pair of socks.” 
Neither “I drove to the store” (my conduct) nor “because I wanted to buy 
a pair of socks” (my state of mind) is an assertion of law. Both are 
assertions of fact. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s language in Twombly and Iqbal about 
“legal conclusions,” neither Twombly nor Iqbal depended upon a 
difference between legal and factual assertions. Rather, they relied on a 
distinction between factual conclusions (whether the Twombly defendants 
agreed not to compete, whether Ashcroft and Mueller intended to 
discriminate) and factual supporting allegations (what the 
telecommunications companies said and did, what Ashcroft and Mueller 
said and did).20 These cases involved distinguishing two types of 
allegations—legally operative factual conclusions, on one side, and 
supporting facts, on the other—but the relevant line is not a law-fact 
distinction. The phrase “legal conclusion,” as used in Twombly and Iqbal, 
is distinctly unhelpful and misleading.21 
III. KEEPING AN OPEN MIND ABOUT AN ELUSIVE DISTINCTION
Once one sees that the cases involve a conclusion-fact distinction 
rather than a law-fact distinction, one may ask whether the distinction 
has any meaning at all. I am a proceduralist, not an epistemologist. But 
 19 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (quoting First Amended Complaint & Jury Demand ¶ 96, Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662 (No. 04 CV 1809 (JG)(JA)). 
 20 See, e.g., id. at 681 (“To be clear, we do not reject these bald allegations on the ground that 
they are unrealistic or nonsensical. . . . It is the conclusory nature of respondent’s allegations, 
rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of 
truth.”). 
21 See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 859 (2010) (“The majority in Iqbal is extremely unclear as 
to why these allegations were legal conclusions.”).
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even I can understand that, deep down, there is no satisfying difference 
between a conclusion and a fact. At some level, everything is inference; all 
factual assertions are conclusions. I have struggled with Iqbal because the 
distinction struck me as empty from the start. It is hard to discern why 
Ashcroft and Mueller’s state of mind and the telecommunications 
companies’ agreement are deemed conclusions while other allegations in 
the complaints are deemed non-conclusions entitled to an assumption of 
truth. 
I am not the only one who found the Iqbal distinction perplexing.22 
But I have tried to keep an open mind about the distinction for two 
reasons. The first reason, simply put, is that the Supreme Court is the 
Supreme Court, and I am not. They have the power to say what the law 
is, including the meaning of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I can 
criticize, but it is not productive for me to throw up my hands and refuse 
to understand what they said. 
The second reason I have tried to remain open to Iqbal’s conclusion-
fact distinction is more substantive. In other endeavors, plenty of 
humans, including myself, distinguish between conclusions and the facts 
that permit them to reach those conclusions. In a scientific paper, for 
example, the author reports the facts—what experiment was conducted 
and what happened—as well as the conclusions the author draws from 
those facts.23 Even if readers assume the author’s factual recitation is true 
(the experimental method and data), they may question whether the 
author’s inferences are justified. If, in other endeavors, we routinely draw 
distinctions between conclusions and supporting facts, perhaps the task 
of doing so with regard to pleadings is not hopeless.24 The distinction 
 22 See, e.g., id. at 885 (“Iqbal . . . adopts a two-pronged approach with a first prong that makes 
little sense.”); Kochan, supra note 14, at 249 (“We are left with none of the Justices really telling 
us what ‘conclusory’ means, but each knowing when or if they saw it.”); Alex Reinert, Pleading 
as Information-Forcing, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2012) (“But even more striking is the 
confusion that the two cases have created for the advocates and judges who have to grapple with 
the new pleading standard.”). 
23 My thanks to Benjamin Zipursky for this analogy. 
 24 Moreover, even under a notice pleading regime, a pleading must do more than assert that 
the defendant is liable; the complaint must tell a narrative from which a court can conclude that, 
if proved, the story meets the elements of a claim. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) 
(requiring that a complaint give the defendant “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests”). 
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concerns factual assertions to be believed only if supported by other 
factual assertions. 
The academic literature on pleadings has offered a number of ways 
to think about applying Iqbal to distinguish between allegations that 
warrant an assumption of truth and those that do not. To the extent there 
is any unifying theme, it is a general agreement on the elusiveness of the 
distinction. 
Donald Kochan produced a thorough exploration of the word 
“conclusory” as used throughout legal history and as brought to the fore 
in Iqbal.25 He concluded that the word lacks a single coherent definition, 
and he found it “questionable whether the Iqbal test provides anything 
approaching a workable standard.”26 Kochan focused specifically and 
lexicographically on the word conclusory rather than more broadly on the 
conclusion-fact distinction, but his analysis sheds light on the elusiveness 
of the concept of “conclusoriness,” not merely on the word itself. He 
analogized the Iqbal standard to Justice Potter Stewart’s notorious 
standard for identifying hard-core pornography in the First Amendment 
context: “I know it when I see it.”27 Because of the lack of definition in 
Iqbal, Kochan predicted uncertainty in its application: “[u]ntil there is 
some more concrete and understandable guidance on the first prong of 
Iqbal,” Kochan wrote, “the meaning of ‘conclusory’ in that case will 
remain quite elusory to all those involved in civil litigation.”28 
Others have offered their own spin on Twombly and Iqbal for 
analyzing the sufficiency of pleadings. Edward Hartnett’s helpful 
formulation explained the cases in terms of stepping back from a 
statement of each element of a claim and offering a narrative to support 
that element.29 To explain the Iqbal conclusion-fact distinction, Hartnett 
invoked commentaries on pleading by Charles Clark, a framer of the 
original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Quoting Clark, Harnett wrote, 
“[a] conclusory allegation is one that asserts ‘the final and ultimate 
25 See Kochan, supra note 14. 
26 Id. at 306. 
27 Id. at 219 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
28 Id. at 222. 
29 Hartnett, supra note 11, at 491 (defining “conclusory allegation” and suggesting that 
“[s]uch an allegation is not itself assumed to be true, but must be supported by the pleader going 
a ‘step further back’ and alleging the basis from which this conclusion follows”). 
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conclusion which the court is to make in deciding the case for him,’ that 
is, one that alleges an element of a claim.”30 
Robert Bone similarly explained the Court’s reasoning in terms of 
disregarding allegations that are pleaded “at too high a level of 
generality.”31 In contrast to Hartnett, Bone deemphasized whether a 
pleading tracks the elements of a legal claim, instead focusing on whether 
a complaint as a whole offers enough specificity to permit courts to screen 
for non-meritorious claims.32 On Bone’s view, the conclusion-fact prong 
of the analysis disappears into the plausibility analysis.33Adam Steinman 
suggested that Twombly and Iqbal could be reconciled with prior cases 
by viewing them as requiring a transactional approach to pleading, or 
what he labeled as “plain pleading.”34 The key question going forward,” 
according to Steinman, is “to assess whether an allegation may be 
disregarded as conclusory under the Iqbal framework. One answer is to 
define conclusory in transactional terms: an allegation is conclusory only 
when it fails to identify adequately the acts or events that entitle the 
plaintiff to relief from the defendant.”35 
IV. COMING TO TERMS WITH THE CONCLUSION-FACT DISTINCTION,
BUCKET BY BUCKET 
The best hope for understanding Iqbal’s conclusion-fact distinction 
is to look at how it is applied by district courts in a variety of recent cases. 
What are district judges actually doing with the distinction, ten years after 
Iqbal?36 
 30 Id. (quoting CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 234 (2d ed. 
1947)). 
31 Bone, supra note 21, at 860–61. 
32 See id. at 868. 
33 See id. at 869. 
34 Steinman, supra note 3, at 1339; see also Adam N. Steinman, The Rise and Fall of 
Plausibility Pleading?, 69 VAND. L. REV. 333, 353 (2016) (referring to his pleading approach as 
“transactional”). 
35 Steinman, supra note 3, at 1298. 
 36 This Section offers an account of recent district court cases applying the Iqbal conclusion-
fact distinction. It does not purport to offer a thorough empirical analysis. While not exhaustive, 
it should suffice to illustrate several categories of cases in which the conclusion-fact distinction 
frames judicial analysis of pleadings. 
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A number of cases applying the distinction seem to fall into a few 
big buckets. These buckets include cases involving: (a) pleadings that fail 
to specify the involvement of particular defendants in multi-defendant 
actions; (b) pleadings that fail to specify the basis for alleging the existence 
of a custom, practice, or policy; (c) pleadings that fail to specify the basis 
for alleging the existence of an agreement or conspiracy; and (d) 
pleadings that allege a defendant’s state of mind without alleging 
observable facts to support the inference. In some cases, the pleadings fall 
into more than one of these buckets, such as civil rights cases involving 
complaints that generally allege a practice or policy and generally allege 
the involvement of multiple defendants. 
A. Cases Regarding Individual Participation
A set of cases that follow the Iqbal model closely are those that treat 
allegations of a supervisor’s participation as mere conclusions that are not 
entitled to an assumption of truth. Some of these cases concern the 
supervisor’s liability. As occurred in Iqbal, courts have dismissed claims 
against supervisors upon concluding that plaintiffs overreached by 
naming defendants up the chain of command without sufficient 
allegations to specify the basis for liability against the higher-up 
defendants. Others of these cases concern groups of defendants—not 
necessarily supervisors—without sufficient allegations regarding each 
defendant’s individual participation. 
For example, in Hyberg v. Enslow,37 an inmate filed a 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 claim against four correctional facility employees, asserting that
they conducted illegal strip searches. One of the defendants, Rittenhouse,
was not alleged to have been present during either of the strip searches
but was alleged to have ordered the searches under illegal conditions.38
After reciting the Iqbal framework,39 the magistrate judge found the
complaint’s allegations insufficient: “[t]hese allegations are too
37 No. 18-cv-00014-RM-NRN, 2019 WL 979026 (D. Colo. Feb. 28, 2019). 
 38 Id. at *2 (noting that the complaint alleged that Rittenhouse “ordered both searches”); id. 
at *7 (“According to Mr. Hyberg’s complaint, neither Mr. Rittenhouse nor Mr. Cunningham 
personally participated in or were even present during either the January 24 or April 17, 2017 
searches.”).  
39 Id. at *3. 
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conclusory to plausibly allege Mr. Rittenhouse’s personal participation in 
either the January 24 or April 17, 2017 search.”40 
Similarly, in Miller v. Luzerne County Department of Corrections,41 
an inmate asserted claims against fourteen defendants related to a strip 
search. The district court dismissed the claims with respect to five of the 
fourteen defendants. Regarding the claims against a particular 
correctional officer and trooper, after setting forth the Iqbal framework,42 
the court explained, “Mr. Miller fails to make any specific averments with 
respect to CO Flynn or Tpr. Kosakevitch’s involvement in the various 
events which allegedly led to the violation of his constitutional rights. 
Neither defendant is alleged to have known of or participated in the April 
2016 strip search.”43 The court granted the plaintiff twenty-one days “to 
file an amended complaint alleging the personal involvement of CO 
Flynn and Tpr. Kosakevitch and any others he claims were involved” in 
the strip search or in acts of retaliation.44 
In Korth v. Hoover,45 plaintiff Korth alleged that he was assaulted by 
police officer Botts when Korth went to the municipal building to file a 
grievance. His complaint asserted claims against the officer’s supervisors, 
alleging that the supervisors “condoned, if not encouraged, the unlawful 
behavior of Botts leading up to and including the attack upon Mr. 
Korth.”46 The complaint alleged that the supervisors provided “either no, 
or inadequate, training to Botts pertaining to the outrageous and 
egregiously unprofessional misconduct, including sexual harassment and 
similar complaints against police officers, including the handling of 
citizens like Mr. Korth who made such complaints.”47 The complaint 
alleged that the defendants failed “to appropriately hire, train, supervise, 
discipline, and investigate Botts,” and that the “individual defendants 
assisted each other in performing the various actions described, and lent 
their physical presence, support and the authority of their office to each 
40 Id. at *8. 
41 No. 3:18-CV-0858, 2019 WL 1040675 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2019). 
42 Id. at *2–3. 
43 Id. at 12. 
44 Id. 
45 190 F. Supp. 3d 394 (M.D. Pa. 2016). 
46 Id. at 405. 
47 Id. 
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other during said events.”48 Applying the Twombly-Iqbal conclusion-fact 
distinction,49 the court found these allegations insufficient. The district 
judge explained, “Plaintiff had to specify what Botts’ previous ‘outrageous 
and egregious unprofessional misconduct’ was and describe what the 
‘numerous citizen complaints’ were.”50 Regarding the “failure to” claims 
(failure to hire, train, supervise, discipline, and investigate), “Plaintiff also 
had to allege specific training that should have been provided and the 
supervisory practice that was not employed.”51 
In non-supervisor cases, as well, allegations of participation by 
multiple defendants have been treated as conclusions. In Robb v. 
Connecticut Board of Veterinary Medicine,52 a veterinarian asserted an 
antitrust claim against the state veterinary board and its five individual 
members. The court found the complaint inadequate, and explained its 
reasoning both in terms of insufficient allegations of agreement à la 
Twombly and in terms of insufficient allegations of participation by each 
individual defendant: 
Dr. Robb makes only conclusory allegations as to an agreement 
among the Individual Defendants, either tacit or express. The 
Amended Complaint does not describe any action to that effect 
engaged in by any of the Individual Defendants. The pleading 
refers to the alleged conspirators by name only once, and then 
only to identify the parties to the litigation. By failing to make a 
single allegation as to the conduct of the individuals that 
allegedly came to an illegal agreement, [plaintiff has failed 
adequately to allege an antitrust violation].53 
In Lentz v. Taylor,54 the plaintiff alleged that a large number of 
defendants “deliberately fabricated, suppressed, and destroyed 
exculpatory evidence” and thereby violated her due process rights in 
connection with her criminal trial.55 The court, applying the Iqbal 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 398–99. 
50 Id. at 405. 
51 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
52 157 F. Supp. 3d 130 (D. Conn. 2016). 
53 Id. at 144. 
54 No. 17-4515 (RBK/JS), 2019 WL 1091392 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2019). 
55 Id. at 33. 
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framework, found the allegations “overly vague and conclusory” because 
they lumped defendants together: “[t]his grouping of Defendants erodes 
any specific factual allegations against each Defendant. . . . This Court 
will not impute generalized allegations onto specific Defendants.”56 
The bottom line is that district courts apply Iqbal to require that 
pleadings particularize allegations as to individual defendants rather than 
lump all defendants together. Even if a plaintiff may have a claim against 
someone, these cases make it clear that the plaintiff cannot simply name 
anyone as a defendant, even if they are part of a group that has acted 
wrongly, and even if they occupy a position of supervisory responsibility. 
District courts seem to take Iqbal as an instruction and reaffirmation that 
a complaint against multiple defendants must state the basis for liability 
against each. 
B. Cases Regarding Custom, Practice, or Policy
Some cases treat allegations of the existence of a custom, practice, or 
policy as mere conclusions that are not entitled to an assumption of truth. 
In particular, courts have applied Iqbal to throw out claims of “unofficial 
policies” where the complaint does not adequately say what the policy is 
or offer more than speculation regarding the policy’s existence. 
In DeLeon v. City of Vista,57 the complaint alleged that law 
enforcement officers used excessive force and asserted a Monell claim58 
against the city, county, sheriff, and deputy mayor. The complaint alleged 
that these municipal and supervisory defendants should be liable for 
“unlawful policies, customs and habits of improper and inadequate 
hiring, training, retention, discipline and supervision of its 
deputies/patrol officers, proximately causing the constitutional 
 56 Id. at 34–35 (citing Vaughn v. Geo Grp., No. 18-10148 (JMV) (SCM), 2018 WL 3056066 
(D.N.J. June 20, 2018)); see also Martin v. Cty. of Atlantic, No. 18-11931 (RBK/AMD), 2019 WL 
1012011, at *5 n.6 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2019) (“Plaintiff’s failure to identify which officers, aside from 
Perna, engaged in the alleged ‘protective sweep’ by the barn fails to sufficiently allege each party’s 
personal involvement in the alleged violation. If Plaintiff decides to amend, she must specify 
which Defendants engaged in which allegedly wrongful conduct on this and all other counts pled 
as a group.”). 
57 No. 18cv714 JM(BGS), 2019 WL 969544 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2019). 
58 See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978) (permitting 
§ 1983 civil rights claims to be brought against local governments).
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deprivations.”59 The complaint further alleged that “the City and County, 
through its patrol division, has a custom, policy or practice of failing to 
properly investigate citizen complaints and failing to take corrective or 
disciplinary action against officers who act improperly, thus leading to 
constitutional violations against Thomas,” and the complaint added 
allegations about several incidents in which deputies were alleged to have 
used unnecessary force.60 The district court, relying on Iqbal, found the 
allegations inadequate: 
[The Second Amended Complaint’s (SAC’s)] allegations fall 
short of establishing a Monell claim. The SAC’s reference to 
several random incidents allegedly involving County and City 
officials using unnecessary force do not establish a cognizable 
§ 1983 claim. Of the approximately 15,000 annual contacts
between the citizenry and County and City’s deputies, Plaintiffs
cite only a few incidents of alleged excessive force. Such
allegations do not reasonably establish either a custom, practice,
or policy; and are insufficient to establish a claim for liability
under Monell. Plaintiffs[’] conclusory allegations fail to comply
with the requisite pleading standards. After Iqbal, boilerplate
allegations and ‘threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice’
to state a claim.61
Because the complaint had failed adequately to allege a municipal 
custom, practice, or policy, the court dismissed the Monell claim against 
the municipal defendants even as the court denied motions to dismiss the 
plaintiff’s state law claims.62 
In Estate of Binn v. City of Adamsville,63 the complaint alleged that 
the defendant city and two supervisors, Cotton and Carter, had an 
“unofficial custom” and “unofficial policy” of failing to investigate 
59 DeLeon, 2019 WL 969544, at *4. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 56 U.S. 662, 662 (2009)). 
62 Id. at *6. 
63 No. 2.17-cv-01993-RDP, 2019 WL 968904 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 28, 2019). 
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crimes.64 As to the supervisors, the court found the allegations “wholly 
conclusory,”65 explaining: 
Plaintiff has alleged no facts showing a specific policy 
implemented or enforced by Cotton and Carter. Plaintiff has not 
alleged any facts supporting a custom of failing to investigate or 
any facts showing a persistent and widespread practice of failing 
to investigate. In fact, Plaintiff has alleged no facts regarding any 
other investigation.66 
As to the municipality, the court similarly found the complaint’s 
allegation of an “unofficial custom” and “unofficial policy” unavailing: 
Plaintiff has not alleged with proper specificity a custom or 
practice by Adamsville allowing such behavior. For example, 
Plaintiff has not alleged that any similar incidents occurred that 
would have placed Adamsville on notice of the need for 
additional training and supervision. Similarly, Plaintiff has not 
made any other factual allegations which would explain why 
additional training or supervision was obviously necessary.67 
Finding the allegations “conclusory and devoid of factual content,” 
the court dismissed the claim against the municipality.68 
In Whitener v. Parker,69 a prisoner pro se plaintiff alleged that the 
defendants failed to provide him adequate medical care. The district 
judge explained why the complaint must be dismissed: 
Plaintiff avers that unspecified Defendants essentially gave him 
the runaround and ignored his need for surgery “in order to save 
cost.” But Whitener provides only conclusions that [Tennessee 
Department of Corrections] policies were in play to prevent his 
medical care. He does not set forth any factual allegations to 
support his claim that the policies were the moving force behind 
the alleged deficiencies in his medical treatment.70 
64 Id. at *8. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at *9. 
68 Id. 
69 No. 1:17-cv-01241-JDB-egb, 2019 WL 1030544 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 4, 2019). 
70 Id. at *3. 
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Citing the Iqbal principle that conclusions “are not entitled to the 
assumption of truth” and “must be supported by factual allegations,”71 the 
judge dismissed the complaint but granted leave to amend.72 
In Korth, discussed above in connection with supervisory liability, 
the court found that the complaint failed to specify the policy or custom 
that allegedly caused the assault on the plaintiff by a police officer:73 “[w]e 
disagree with Plaintiff that he has clearly specified the policies and 
customs that caused him harm. As noted above, Plaintiff must plead 
sufficient facts to make his claim plausible, and we cannot accept 
allegations that are mere conclusions,” the court explained. “As set forth 
above, Plaintiff’s allegations bearing on policy and custom are totally 
conclusional.”74 
C. Cases Regarding Agreement or Conspiracy
Some cases, closely following the Twombly model, treat allegations 
of agreement or conspiracy as mere conclusions that are not entitled to 
an assumption of truth.  
In Robb, the court not only found the allegations insufficient as to 
each of the individual defendants,75 it also, relatedly, found the allegation 
of agreement unsatisfactory: “to satisfy the pleading requirement at the 
Rule 12(b)(6) stage, an antitrust plaintiff may not simply allege that ‘the 
parties agreed.’ . . . [A]ny conclusory allegation of an ‘agreement’ is not to 
be accepted as true; the plaintiff must allege facts affirmatively 
71 Id. at *2 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 56 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). 
72 Id. at *4. 
73 See supra text accompanying notes 45–51. 
74 Korth v. Hoover, 190 F. Supp. 3d 394, 405 (M.D. Pa. 2016); see also Najera v. Green, No. 
CV 18-07116 FMO (AFM), 2019 WL 1059684, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019) (finding that the 
complaint, which alleged that the mayor of Los Angeles failed to enforce rules and regulations, 
was insufficient because it “fails to set forth any factual allegations that a specific policy or custom 
promulgated by the City of Los Angeles was the ‘actionable cause’ of a specific constitutional 
violation,” and because it did not state “what specific rules or regulations were not enforced, 
when the rule or regulation was not enforced, how non-enforcement impacted plaintiff, and what 
constitutional violation resulted”). 
 75 Robb v. Conn. Bd. of Veterinary Med., 157 F. Supp. 3d 130, 147 (D. Conn. 2016); see supra 
text accompanying notes 52–53. 
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demonstrating such an agreement.”76 The court went on to suggest what 
sort of allegations might have sufficed: 
By failing to make a single allegation as to the conduct of the 
individuals that allegedly came to an illegal agreement, nor as to 
the form, dates, place, structure, or detail of such an agreement, 
Dr. Robb faces a significant hurdle, as a matter of law, to support 
his claim of an antitrust conspiracy. To establish the factual 
underpinning of an actual “agreement,” a party must allege facts 
that in some way describe the process of that agreement’s 
formation.77 
Similarly, in Kerwin v. Parx Casino,78 the court dismissed the 
plaintiff’s Sherman Act claim because the complaint failed to provide 
supporting facts for its allegation of agreement: 
Plaintiff alleges an agreement to boycott Plaintiff and his MMA 
events only in the most conclusory of terms. For example, the 
sole allegation in the Amended Complaint of an alleged 
conspiracy states: “[a]ll of the Pennsylvania Casinos, acting in 
concert with one another are now boycotting plaintiff from 
being able to promote his mixed martial arts events at all of their 
casinos . . . .”79 
In the absence of supporting factual allegations, the court ruled, such 
an allegation of conspiracy is not entitled to the assumption of truth.80 
In a very different factual context, the Binn81 court similarly found a 
non-specific allegation of conspiracy inadequate: “Plaintiff alleges 
Defendants concerted and conspired ‘by failing to conduct a proper 
investigation.’ There are no allegations regarding communications 
between Defendants, underlying agreements reached, or specific action 
in concert. Simply put, such conclusory allegations, with no factual 
support, are insufficient to state a claim.”82 
76 Robb, 157 F. Supp. at 143. 
77 Id. at 144. 
78 No. 17-CV-5582, 2019 WL 1098949 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2019). 
79 Id. at *5. 
80 Id. 
81 See supra text accompanying notes 63–68. 
82 Estate of Binn v. City of Adamsville, No.: 2:17-cv-01993-RDP, 2019 WL 968904, at *10 
(N.D. Ala. Feb. 28, 2019) (citation omitted). 
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In Pagliaroli v. Ahsan,83 a prisoner sued numerous defendants on 
claims related to the denial of medical care for his neck and back 
problems. Among other things, the complaint asserted that eight named 
defendants as well as John Doe defendants conspired to deny him proper 
medical care. The court found the complaint “devoid of any facts to 
suggest a conspiracy amongst the Defendants. Instead, Plaintiff merely 
states these individuals conspired in a conclusory manner, which is 
insufficient to state a claim for conspiracy.”84 
In the context of a plaintiff’s allegation of conspiracy to establish 
state action for a § 1983 claim, the court in Lentz85 explained the 
complaint’s insufficiency with regard to one of the defendants: 
Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that [Defendant DFDR 
Consulting] engaged in a conspiracy. Most obviously, the 
Amended Complaint offers but a series of vague conclusions. 
For example, in her claim of a conspiracy between DFDR and 
the Cape May County Prosecutor, Plaintiff provides no specific 
factual allegations against DFDR. Instead, DFDR is lumped 
under the amorphous umbrella of “Defendants,” who “act[ed] 
in concert and conspiracy.”86  
The court concluded that the complaint offered “merely a 
conclusory allegation of agreement at some unspecified point, which does 
not supply adequate facts to show illegality.”87 As to another set of 
defendants, the court similarly found the allegation of conspiracy to be 
conclusory, noting that the defendants were “impermissibly lumped 
together” and “Plaintiff alleges no facts to support any meeting of the 
minds.”88 
83 No. 18-9683 (BRM), 2019 WL 979244 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2019). 
84 Id. at *5. 
85 Lentz v. Taylor, No. 17-4515 (RBK/JS), 2019 WL 1091392 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2019). 
86 Id. at *5. 
87 Id. (quoting Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 179 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007))). 
88 Id. at *7. 
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D. Cases Regarding State of Mind
In many cases, judges treat state-of-mind allegations as conclusions 
that are not entitled to an assumption of truth. Some of these cases 
resemble Iqbal in that they involve various forms of discriminatory 
intent. Other cases involve other states of mind, such as deliberate 
indifference and bad faith. That state-of-mind allegations are a leading 
application of Twombly and Iqbal is ironic, as others have noted,89 in light 
of Rule 9(b)’s explicit instruction that “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and 
other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”90 But 
perhaps it is unsurprising, inasmuch as the application to state-of-mind 
allegations hews close to Iqbal itself. 
In Guy v. City of Wilmington,91 the court refused to accord the 
assumption of truth to the complaint’s allegation that the defendant had 
intentionally divided funds unequally: 
Even accepting arguendo, that Guy was treated differently than 
others similarly situated, he has further failed to state a plausible 
claim that Defendant’s separate treatment of him was 
intentional. Plaintiff’s equal protection claim simply states 
“[t]he discretionary funds were intentionally divided 
unequally.” As stated in Iqbal, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels 
and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 
cause of action will not do.’” The Amended Complaint’s 
allegation of intentional discrimination is purely conclusory and 
insufficient to support a class of one theory for an equal 
protection clause violation.92 
In Carson v. Wetzel,93 the complaint alleged that prison medical 
personnel “deliberately treated Plaintiff differently because of his mental 
instability, race and weight,”94 and the court found this “conclusory 
averment” insufficient to state a claim.95 The court explained that 
89 See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 22, at 7 n.43. 
90 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
91 No. 17-576 (MN), 2019 WL 973579 (D. Del. Feb. 28, 2019). 
92 Id. at *4 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 56 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 
93 No. 17-73 Erie, 2019 WL 972102 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2019). 
94 Id. at *3. 
95 Id. 
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“Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts to support this averment; indeed, he 
has failed to even articulate his race, weight, or the name or nature of the 
mental impairment that he allegedly suffers from.”96 
Some cases apply Iqbal’s conclusion-fact distinction to allegations of 
“deliberate indifference,” holding that the conclusion of deliberate 
indifference must be backed up by supporting allegations of facts. In 
Pagliaroli,97 for example, a prisoner alleged that the defendants were 
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The court treated the 
allegation of deliberate indifference as a conclusion, not entitled to the 
assumption of truth: 
Plaintiff’s Complaint relies on formulaic language and does not 
provide sufficient facts describing the policy or procedure in 
effect at the time of the alleged injury or how that policy or 
procedure caused his constitutional injury. He generally refers 
to cost-saving measures, understaffing and substandard medical 
personnel, but with no specific facts. Nor has he provided facts 
to suggest Defendant Johnson was deliberately indifferent to the 
risk presented by the policy in effect at the time of his alleged 
injury; instead, again, he merely states in a conclusory manner 
that Defendant Johnson was deliberately indifferent.98 
96 Id. 
 97 Pagliaroli v. Ahsan, No. 18-9683 (BRM), 2019 WL 979244 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2019); see supra 
text accompanying notes 83–84. 
98 Pagliaroli, 2019 WL 979244, at *4. Similarly, in Williams v. Ellerbe, 317 F. Supp. 3d 144 
(D.D.C. 2018), a case involving an Eighth Amendment claim by an inmate allegedly beaten by 
officers, the court treated the complaint’s allegation of “deliberate indifference” by the District of 
Columbia as a mere conclusion: 
To begin, the Court may not credit legal conclusions that are not supported by factual 
allegations. The allegations of fact raised in the amended complaint, however, establish 
only that the District had knowledge after the fact that two of its employees beat 
Williams. Those allegations do not address what the District knew or should have 
known before the alleged attack, and they do not support a claim that the District’s 
deliberate indifference caused or failed to prevent the incident. 
Id. at 149 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). And in Erdreich v. City of Philadelphia, 
No. 18-2290, 2019 WL 1060051 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2019), the court declined to accept as true the 
complaint’s general allegations that the city was “deliberately indifferent and reckless with respect 
to Mr. Erdreich’s need for medical attention.” Id. at *3. Further,  
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Other cases use the Iqbal conclusion-fact distinction to reject 
allegations of various other states of mind, including retaliatory intent,99 
intentional distortion,100 and bad faith.101 
What these cases have in common is that, notwithstanding Rule 
9(b), these district judges seem to consider it too easy for plaintiffs to 
allege what is in someone else’s head. These judges therefore use Iqbal to 
require that a complaint do more than recite the formulaic words 
(discriminatory intent, deliberate indifference, bad faith); the complaint 
must recite observable facts to support the inference.102 
CONCLUSION (IF I MAY SAY SO) 
District judges use Iqbal’s conclusion-fact distinction to disregard 
plaintiffs’ allegations in a variety of situations where a particular element 
of a civil claim is easy to allege in general terms even if it may not be 
supportable. Recurrent scenarios involve allegations of conspiracy, 
discriminatory intent, deliberate indifference, participation of an entire 
group of individuals, and existence of an unofficial policy. What comes 
through in these cases is skepticism on the part of the district court judges 
about whether the plaintiffs have facts to back up their general allegations. 
In this way, a kind of plausibility analysis infuses the first step of the Iqbal 
test. That is, district judges disregard allegations where, because of the 
the allegations advanced by Plaintiff in this case simply paraphrase the legal standard 
for a deliberate indifference claim. While a court at the motion to dismiss stage is 
required to accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint, it “need not credit a 
complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’ when deciding a motion to dismiss.”  
Id. at *9 (citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The court 
noted that Erdreich failed to allege any facts to establish that the commissioner was on notice of 
any problem in training or supervision that caused his injuries. Id. at *10; see also Korth v. 
Hoover, 190 F. Supp. 3d 394, 405 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (treating complaint’s many allegations of 
“deliberate indifference” as conclusions not entitled to assumption of truth). 
 99 See Hyberg v. Enslow, No. 18-cv-00014-RM-NRN, 2019 WL 979026, at *10 (D. Colo. Feb. 
28, 2019) (“Mr. Hyberg’s allegations concerning Mr. Quinn’s anger over the cost of rebuilding 
the strip out area are conclusory and devoid of ‘sufficient factual matter . . . .”). 
 100 See Estate of Binn v. City of Adamsville, No.: 2:17-cv-01993-RDP, 2019 WL 968904 (N.D. 
Ala. Feb. 28, 2019). 
101 See Sgrillo v. Geico Casualty Co., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1167 (D. Nev. 2018). 
 102 Again, this application of Iqbal is jarring in light of Rule 9(b)’s provision that states of mind 
may be averred generally, but it is nonetheless an application that hews close to the Iqbal decision 
itself. 
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nature of the allegation and the level of generality at which the allegation 
is made,103 the judge questions whether the plaintiff has any factual basis 
to satisfy an element of a claim. 
Twombly and Iqbal, as a matter of procedural policy, pit the value of 
court access against the value of weeding out potentially non-meritorious 
claims. While both of these functions have value, other devices such as 
summary judgment can carry much of the weight on the latter function, 
and my own view is that Twombly and Iqbal have made it too easy for 
judges to throw out claims before plaintiffs have obtained discovery and 
before defendants have had to admit or deny plaintiffs’ allegations.104 But 
if one takes the Supreme Court’s policy choice as a given, one can ask 
another question: whether the Court’s chosen mechanism—a distinction 
between conclusions and other factual allegations—can be applied 
coherently. My skepticism on this front has given way to grudging 
acknowledgement that, at least in several large categories of cases, judges 
can draw the distinction. 
The first step to understanding the distinction is to disregard the 
Supreme Court’s misleading language about “legal conclusions.” Looking 
at what the Court actually did in Twombly and Iqbal shows that the 
conclusion-fact distinction does not ask judges to distinguish between 
law and fact, but rather to identify assertions that are to be believed, for 
purposes of a motion to dismiss, only if supported by other assertions. 
The next step is to consider the types of cases in which the distinction is 
regularly applied. Examination of recent cases shows that there are 
buckets of cases in which district judges distinguish allegations of 
conclusions from allegations of supporting facts in a reasonably 
straightforward manner. 
Perhaps it is damning with faint praise to say of a Supreme Court 
case that its central lesson, while troubling as a matter of access to justice, 
is not completely incoherent. But that captures where this proceduralist 
finds himself on Iqbal, ten years later. 
 103 See Bone, supra note 21, at 859–60. The way plausibility analysis informs the conclusion-
fact distinction matches Bone’s explanation of Iqbal. See supra text accompanying notes 31–33. 
 104 For an early and powerful articulation of this view, see A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility 
Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008). 
